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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DIANE FISH, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEFFREY J. FISH, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20090916 
Civil No. 074901990DA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(h), appeals from the district court involving domestic relations including, but not 
limited to, divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
L Did the trial court err in failing to impute full-time employment *• ppellee, Diane Fish? 
Standard of Review. Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards so long 
as they consider at least the following factors: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children requiring support; 
- 1 -
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the 
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(vii) (Supp. 2008). In addition, trial courts must be mindful of 
the primary purposes of alimony: "(1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same standard of 
living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of each party; and (3) to 
prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 
942, 943 (Utah 2008). Where a trial court considers these factors, we will disturb its alimony award 
only if there is "'a serious inequity...manifest [ing] a clear abuse of discretion.'" Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 
UT App 236,1f 26, 9 P.3d 171 (quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
Issue preserved in the record: the issue was preserved in the record in Transcript volume I 
p. 17-18; volume p. 45-46. 
2. Did the trial court err in imputing full-time income to Jeffery Fish, considering he was 
engaged in career or occupational training, and fail to support it with specific, detailed findings 
of fact? 
Standard of Review. Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining the financial 
interests of divorced parties. Allred v. Alfred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.1990). Although "the 
trial court's 'actions are entitled to a presumption of validity,'" zd. (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 
P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)), appellate courts cannot 
affirm its determination when the trial court abuses its discretion. Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d at 1111 
(Utah App.1990). The trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings 
supporting its financial determinations. See id. Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently 
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detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." Id. (Quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 
App.1988)). See also Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App.1992) (detailed findings are 
necessary to determine whether trial court has exercised its discretion in a rational manner). 
Issue preserved in the record. The issue was preserved in the record in Transcript volume 
I p. 197-200; volume lip. 6; volume lip. 15-32; volume III p. 53-56. 
3. Did the trial court err in establishing alimony by failing to consider the parties' historical 
income and standard of living? 
Standard of Review. An appellate court reviews a trial court's determination of alimony 
for abuse of discretion. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). A district court has broad 
discretion when deciding alimony awards. Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983). In 
addition to the Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) factors, a trial court shall consider 
the primary aims of alimony when establishing an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to 
the same standard of living that existed during the marriage, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) 
(Supp.2007); (2) to equalize the standards of living of each party, see id. § 30-3-5(8)(d); and (3) to 
prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge, English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 
(Utah 1977). 
Issue preserved in the record. The issue was preserved in the record at Transcript volume 
III p. 47. 
4. Did the trial court err in imputing $30,000 to $40,000 annual income to Jeffery Fish and 
fail to support it with specific, detailed findings of fact? 
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Standard of Review. An appellate court will not disturb the trial court's award of spousal 
support absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 
100 (Utah 1986). However, [t]he findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 
"follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986). The findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Acton v. Deliran, 137 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Pucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). See also Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank,613 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) 
(findings of fact must clearly indicate the mind of the court). 
Issue preserved in record. The issue was preserved in the record in Transcript volume III 
p. 48-52. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes are of central importance to the appeal: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)-(d) 
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the 
marriage. 
(b) The court consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on 
the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living. 
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2. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7) 
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial 
proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to the 
evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the 
median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found in the 
statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income 
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater 
income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding 
shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the 
condition is not of a temporary nature: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic 
job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial 
parent's presence in the home. 
- 6 -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case. This is a domestic relations case in which Diane Fish filed for divorce 
against Jeffery J. Fish on October 30, 2007. The Pre-Trial Order certified for trial the issue of 
whether Diane Fish should receive alimony and, if so, the amount. Incorporated in Diane Fish's 
claim for alimony was that Jeffery Fish was capable of employment. Also, certified for trial was 
Diane Fish's claim for one-half QA) of Jeffery Fish's military retirement with the provision she was 
not entitled to any of his disability pay. 
Course of the proceedings. Diane Fish filed a Complaint for Divorce on October 30, 
2007 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. On November 19, 2007, Jeffery Fish filed an 
Answer. Pursuant to stipulation, Jeffery Fish filed an amended Answer and Counter Claim through 
counsel. On January 31, 2008, Diane Fish's Motion for Temporary Orders was heard before the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner. The parties agreed each would be paid $10,000 from the sale of 
their marital residence. Approximately $83,000 was held in Petitioner's attorney trust account from 
sale of their marital home. During the pendency of the proceedings, prior to trial, Diane Fish was not 
awarded temporary alimony nor division of the military retirement. A non-jury trial was held on 
April 27, 28, and 30, 2009 before District Court Judge, Ernie W. Jones. 
The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 16, 2009. The trial court affirmed the 
parties' stipulation Diane Fish was to receive approximately $633 per month as her one-half Q/2) of 
Jeffery Fish's military retirement acquired during the marriage; that Jeffery Fish was to receive $421 
per month VA Disability and $649 per month as his share of the military retirement. 
The trial court found Jeffery Fish was underemployed at the time of trial. The Court 
determined he was capable of full-time employment and imputed $30,000 to $40,000 annual income 
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to him. The trial court found Diane Fish's monthly gross income in 2009 was about $2,000 per 
month and her monthly net pay in 2008 was $1,628. 
The trial determined Jeffery Fish's monthly living expenses to be $2,374 and Diane Fish's 
monthly living expenses to be about $3,000. The trial court found the parties' 2002 through 2008 tax 
returns to be relevant in establishing income potential for both parties. The Court found Diane Fish 
had a need for alimony based on her income and expenses and that Jeffery Fish had an ability to pay 
and ordered $800 per month alimony for a period of 27 years. Each party was ordered to pay their 
own attorney fees as both were found at fault for the divorce and each had the ability to pay their own 
attorney fees. 
Jeffery Fish timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 27, 2009. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Diane Fish and Jeffery Fish were married on September 5, 1980. Transcript volume 1 p. 
126. The parties' separated in October, 2007 and Diane Fish filed for divorce on October 30, 2007. 
(Record at p. 0001) 
2. Diane was 48 years old at the time of trial and had attended technical college after high 
school. Transcript volume 1 p. 127 
3. Diane studied medical assisting at the technical college. Transcript volume 1 p. 128 
4. Diane works for Dr. Robert Capener, DDS as the office manager. The office consists of 
two (2) dentists and five (5) hygienists. Transcript volume 1 p. 158-159. She schedules all of the 
appointments and prepares the payroll. Transcript volume 1 p. 158 
5. There is also employed three (3) other front staff people and other part-time assistants. 
Diane has worked there 14 to 15 years. Transcript volume 1 p. 159 
6. Diane works Monday through Thursday from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., although she does 
work some Fridays. Transcript volume 1 p. 158 
7. Diane Fish earns $15 per hour and had earned that for three (3) or four (4) years. 
Transcript volume 1 p. 160 
8. Diane testified she was prepared to seek other employment in order to have medical 
insurance after the divorce. Transcript volume 1 p. 160 
9. Diane testified it was not unreasonable to say she was able to work 40 hours per week. 
Transcript volume 1 p. 161 
10. Diane also acknowledged it was the norm in this day and age to work 40 hours per week. 
Transcript volume 1 p. 161 
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11. Diane worked part-time throughout the marriage, working around Jeffery's military 
schedule and their children. Transcript volume 1 p. 161 
12. Diane had considered relocating to Las Vegas, Nevada, near her daughter, and also looked 
into a position in Florida as well. Transcript volume 1 p. 162 
13. Diane acknowledged she was looking around for other employment as she had to be able 
to take care of herself. Transcript volume 1 p. 162 
14. Diane admitted she was looking for a 40-hour per week job. Transcript volume 1 p. 162 
15. Diane claimed monthly living expenses of approximately $3,600 per month. Petitioner's 
Exhibit 6 
16. Diane claimed entertainment expenses of $300 per month, $200 per month travel 
expenses, $300 per month for miscellaneous expenses, $50 per month for counseling, and $552 per 
month for automobile expenses in addition to her car payment of $280 per month. Petitioner's 
Exhibit 6 
17. The trial court found Diane's monthly expenses to be about $3,000 a month. Findings of 
Fact 32 
18. Jeffery Fish claimed monthly living expenses of $2,374 per month. Respondent's 
Exhibit 1 
19. The trial court found Jeffery's monthly living expenses to be $2,374 as claimed. Findings 
of Fact 28 
20. Jeffery Fish testified he joined the United State Air Force on June 5,1980 and retired on 
August 1, 2000. Transcript volume 1 p. 96 
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21. Jeffery's monthly military retirement pay is $1,703 gross and $1,477 net monthly pay, 
after taxes and life insurance. Respondent's Exhibit 1 p. 8 
22. The trial court found Diane was entitled to $633 per month gross pay and Jeffery $649 per 
month gross pay, pursuant to the woodward formula in dividing the military retirement as per 
stipulation of the parties, with Jeffery also receiving $421 per month disability pay. Findings of Fact 
9, 10, and 11 
23. Diane testified, after Jeffery retired in 2000, his work was off-and-on jobs, nothing 
stable and that he really did not work a great deal after he retired from the military. Transcript 
volume 1 p. 128, 129, and 175 
24. In 2002, Jeffery earned $45,085 as a logistics specialist at Karta Technologies. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 16, W-2 
25. In 2003, Jeffery earned $18,889 at Karta Technologies. Petitioner's Exhibit 17, W-2. 
Jeffery was terminated at Karta in 2003 for unacceptable performance. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 p. 5 
26. In 2004 and 2005, Jeffery had no earnings as he sold auto parts on E-bay and lost money. 
Respondent's Exhibit 3, p. 3 and Transcript volume 1 p. 128, 129 
27. In 2006, Jeffery earned $20,545 at Fair Air Aviation as an aircraft mechanic. Petitioner's 
Exhibit 20 and Respondent's Exhibit 3, p. 3 
28. In 2007, Jeffery earned $25,710 as an aircraft mechanic at Fair Air Aviation. Petitioner's 
Exhibit 37 
29. In 2008, Jeffery had no earnings as he was attending school at Ogden Weber ATC and was 
paid $671 per month by the Department of Veteran Affairs for vocational rehabilitation. Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1, p. 2 and Transcript volume 1 p. 198 
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30. In 2009, Jeffery was still attending Ogden-Weber ATC, receiving $671 per month for 
vocational rehabilitation, having started school in September, 2008 and anticipated graduating in 
January, 2010. Transcript volume 1 p. 198 
31. Diane Fish earned $17,529 in 2002; $18,561 in 2003; $25,582 in 2004; $27,000 in 2005; 
$26,186 in 2006; $25,710 in 2007; and $25, 862 in 2008. Petitioner's Exhibits 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 37 
and 30 
32. Jeffery testified in 2008 he felt like he could be no longer be an aircraft mechanic and 
applied for vocational rehabilitation. Transcript volume 1 p. 197 
33. Jeffery completed a Functional Capacity Evaluation in 2008, at Wasatch Physical Therapy, 
Inc., which determined his physical ability did not match the requirements of remaining an aircraft 
mechanic as he could not often carry heavy equipment weighing over 70 pounds, engage in repetitive 
bending and twisting to work on aircraft, and stand for eight (8) hour shifts. Respondent's Exhibit 6, 
p. 3 
34. The United States Department of Labor 2008-09 Occupational Outlook Handbook for 
Aircraft Mechanics states aircraft mechanics must lift or pull objects weighing more than 70 pounds, 
often stand, lie, or kneel in awkward positions, and occasionally must work in precarious positions 
such as on a ladder or scaffold, usually work 40 hours a week for eight (8) hour shifts, and that agility 
is important for the reaching and climbing necessary to do the job. Respondent's Exhibit 8, p. 2-3 
35. Ernest Chavez, therapist for Wasatch Physical Therapy, who completed the Functional 
Capacity Evaluation, testified Jeffery also had an abnormal foot condition known as plantar fasciitis, 
which causes pain in the feet if you stand on cement for long periods of time. Transcript volume lip. 
11-12 
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36. Martin Peterson, Jeffery's supervisor at Fair Air Aviation, testified Jeffery would pull off 
his shoes and rub his feet before the shift was over, complaining of sore feet and said his feet hurt him 
badly and he had a hard time getting through the day. Transcript volume lip. 58-59 
37. Jeffery was retired from the Air Force with a 10% disability for lumbar sacral strain. 
Transcript volume II p. 9, volume III p. 10 
38. Martin Peterson testified, aircraft mechanics have to lift and pull objects weighing more 
than 70 pounds, stand and kneel in awkward positions, pull or push airplanes the distance of a hangar 
about 400 feet, and work under the instrument panel and tail section of the airplane. Transcript 
volume lip. 59-61 
39. Kristy Farnsworth, a vocational specialist, was called by Diane Fish regarding jobs in Utah 
and wages. Transcript volume 1 p. 38 
40. Kristy Farnsworth's vocational report was dated August 11, 2008, approximately one (1) 
month before Jeffery started school for vocational rehabilitation. Transcript volume 1, p. 54 
41. Kristy Farnsworth testified Jeffery could find employment as an aircraft mechanic, a sales 
representative, or a logistics specialist. Transcript volume 1 p. 43. She did not agree with the 
conclusion of Ernest Chavez of Wasatch Physical Therapy, Inc. that Jeffery could not be an aircraft 
mechanic. Transcript volume 1 p. 58 
42. Kristy Farnsworth relied on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for a job analysis of 
aircraft mechanics. Transcript volume 1 p. 60. That job analysis is found in Section 1 of her report. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 1 
43. Kristy Farnsworth testified that the job analysis contained in Jeffery Fish's Exhibit 8 for 
Aircraft and Avionics Equipment Mechanics and Service Technicians is a different occupation from 
that of an airframe and power plant mechanic referred to in Section 1 of her report found in 
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Petitioner's Exhibit 1 and Transcript volume 1 p. 67, 68, 
44. Jeffery Fish's Exhibit 89 from the United States Department of Labor for Aircraft 
Mechanics states, on pages 1, 2 of Exhibit 8, that aircraft mechanics are also called airframe 
mechanics, power plant mechanics, and avionics technicians. Most mechanics working on civilian 
aircraft are A&P mechanics. 
45. Martin Peterson testified there is no distinction between aircraft mechanics and A & P 
mechanics and that Jeffery Fish was a licensed A & P mechanic. Transcript volume Up. 57-58 
46. Kristy Farnsworth testified that aircraft mechanics must only lift or pull 50 pounds, not 70 
pounds. Transcript volume I p. 61, Section 1 of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 
47. Kristy Farnsworth testified the "M" in Section 1 of Petitioner's Exhibit stands for 50 
pounds, not 70 pounds. Transcript volume I p. 61 
48. Kristy Farnsworth, in her report, relied on Section 1 to describe the job description of an 
aircraft mechanic, which was written in 1996 and has not been updated since, compared to Jeffery 
Fish's Exhibit 8, prepared for the 2008-09 time frame. 
49. Kristy Farnsworth, in her report, Petitioner's Exhibit 7, does not address the issue of 
repetitive bending, kneeling, awkward positions or plantar fasciitis suffered by Jeffery. Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court has a statutory duty to consider the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income in determining alimony. Diane Fish is underemployed, which the trial court failed to 
address. Diane Fish earns $15 per hour working Monday through Thursday from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 
p.m., although she testified she works some Fridays. She is the office manager for a dental office that 
has two (2) dentists, five (5) hygienists, and several part-time employees. She has worked at that 
office for 14 to 15 years. 
She admitted at trial it was not unreasonable to impute 40 hours a week employment to her. 
She further admitted she was looking for a 40-hour per week job. She testified she was prepared to 
seek other employment in order to have medical insurance after the divorce. She acknowledged it 
was the norm to work 40 hours per week. 
If Diane Fish worked 40 hours per week at $15 per hour, she would gross $2,600 per month 
and net $2,080. Adding to her monthly net pay of $2,080 her share of the military retirement of $633 
per month would yield a total net monthly pay of $2,713. Her need for alimony would be $287 per 
month to meet her monthly financial needs of $3,000, not $800 per month. 
The trial court imputed full-time employment to Jeffery Fish even though he was engaged in 
career or occupational training, attending Ogden-Weber ATC full-time in computer technology. In 
effect, the trial court mandated that Jeffery quit school and become employed full-time, earning 
$30,000 to $40,000 per annum in order to pay Diane Fish $800 per month. 
Jeffery Fish completed a Functional Capacity Evaluation with a physical therapist, which 
determined he did not have the physical capabilities to continue to work as an aircraft mechanic. 
Jeffery Fish's work history in the military and civilian workforce was primarily as an aircraft 
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mechanic. Based upon the Functional Capacity Evaluation, Jeffery could not continue as an aircraft 
mechanic and qualified for vocational rehabilitation with the Department of Veteran Affairs, 
receiving $671 per month to attend Ogden-Weber ATC full-time for an estimated 17 month course in 
computer technology. 
It was error to mandate Jeffery quit school in the middle of his vocational rehabilitation 
training and impute full-time employment to him. Income may not be imputed to Jeffery if Diane was 
asking the Court to impute income to Jeffery for child support and alimony purposes, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203 (7)(d). This statute states income may not be imputed to a parent if the 
parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills and the condition is 
not of a temporary nature. It is unreasonable to impute income to Jeffery at this time, for alimony 
purposes, when, if Jeffery had an obligation to support a minor child, income could not be imputed to 
him if he was engaged in career or occupational training. 
The trial court failed to follow its statutory duty to get the parties as close as possible to the 
same standard of living that existed during the marriage and to equalize the standards of living of 
each party, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) and (d). The parties maintained a modest 
family income and standard of living during the marriage. Ordinarily, the standard of living shall be 
established at the time of separation which, in this case was October, 2007. However, Diane Fish did 
not put on evidence at trial as to the parties' standard of living at the time of separation. She did not 
testify to the parties' past mortgage, utilities, or food at separation. She testified as to her present 
rent, utilities, food and auto expenses in April, 2009, at the time of trial. 
The trial court found Diane's monthly living expenses were $3,000 per month and Jeffery's 
were $2,374 per month. The parties' historical income does not justify a present standard of living of 
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$5,374 per month compared to their actual standard of living during the marriage. Diane testified 
Jeffery really did not work a great deal after he retired in 2000 from the military and his employment 
was not stable. 
Jeffery earned $45,085 in 2002; $18,889 in 2003; none in 2004; none in 2005; $20,545 in 
2006 as an aircraft mechanic; $25,710 in 2007 as an aircraft mechanic; none in 2008 and none in 
2009. 
Diane earned $17,529 in 2002; $18,561 in 2003; $25,582 in 2004; $27,060 in 2005; $26,186 
in 2006; $25,710 in 2007 and $25,862 in 2008. 
Based upon the parties' historical monthly gross earnings, their monthly net pay would not 
justify a standard of living of $5,374 per month as determined by the trial court. The parties' 
historical net monthly pay would establish a monthly standard of living of approximately $2,000 to 
$2,300 per month to each. 
The trial court erred in imputing $30,000 to $40,000 per annum income to Jeffery Fish 
without supporting the imputation of earning ability by detailed, specific findings of fact. The trial 
court does not specify what occupation Jeffery may follow to earn this salary or such jobs were 
available in the present economy. 
The Functional Capacity Evaluation indicates Jeffery does not have the physical ability to 
continue as aircraft mechanic. Jeffery has no experience as a sales representative, which would not 
support the contention he could earn, as a salesman, $28,000 to $53,000 per annum in today's 
economy. The imputation of this wage is speculative and not substantiated. Jeffery was terminated at 
Karta Technologies as a logistics specialist for unacceptable performance. The employment at Karta 
is not a benchmark to establish his ability to earn a living as a logistics specialist. A logistics 
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specialist is really a technical writer which, according to Kristy Farnsworth's report, requires a 
bachelor's degree. The trial court failed to make detailed, specific findings of fact, justifying its 
conclusion that Jeffery can earn $30,000 to $40,000 per annum. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO IMPUTE FULL-TIME 
EMPLOYMENT TO APPELLEE, DIANE FISH 
Counsel for Appellant, Jeffery Fish, requested the trial court impute full-time wages to 
Appellee, Diane Fish, of $2,600 per month ($15 per hour, 40 hours per week). (R at volume III p. 46). 
It was argued Diane Fish is underemployed. Diane Fish testified she earns $15 per hour as the office 
manager for Dr. Robert Capener, DDS. Transcript volume I p. 160. If Diane Fish worked 40 hours 
per week earning $15 per hour, she would gross $2,600 per month and receive a net monthly pay of 
$2,080 per month. Transcript volume III p. 45, 46. It was argued Diane Fish has the ability to earn 
$2,080 per month net pay by simply working 40 hours per week. Transcript volume III p. 46. 
Counsel for Jeffery Fish, in his opening statement, made this argument as well as at the conclusion of 
the trial. (R at volume I p. 17, 18). 
The trial court, in Findings of Fact 29, found Diane Fish earned about $25,000 in gross wages 
in 2008. In Findings of Fact 30, the trial court found her net monthly income for 2008 was $1,628. 
The trial court did not make any findings of fact as to her net monthly income in 2009. However, the 
trial court found her average gross monthly income for January through April, 2009 was $2,000 per 
month. 
If the trial court imputed $2,080 per month net income to Diane Fish from full-time 
employment and added $633 per month as her share of the military retirement, her total net monthly 
income would be $2,713. In Findings of Fact 32, the trial court found Diane Fish's monthly expenses 
to be $3,000 per month. Accordingly, Diane Fish's need for alimony would be $287 per month if she 
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would only work 40 hours per week. Diane Fish's underemployment should not be condoned by the 
Court and imputation of full-time wages to her is appropriate. Diane Fish admitted it was not 
unreasonable to say she was able to work 40 hours a week. (R at volume I p. 161). She further 
admitted it was the norm to work 40 hours per week. (R at volume I p. 161). Diane Fish has been 
employed by Dr. Capener for 14 to 15 years. (R at volume I p. 159). She schedules all the 
appointments for the office. (R at volume I p. 158). She prepares all the payroll. (R at volume I p. 
158-159). The office has two (2) dentists and five (5) hygienists and several part-time employees. (R 
at volume I p. 159). 
Diane Fish testified she was looking for a 40-hour per week job. (R at volume I p. 162). She 
considered relocating to Las Vegas to be near her daughter and she had also looked into a position in 
Florida as well. (R at volume I p. 162). She admitted she was looking around to see what is out there 
as she has to be able to take care of herself. (R at volume I p. 162). 
Diane Fish also admitted Dr. Capener was bringing on a new associate, Dr. Tom Matthews. 
Transcript volume I p. 159. She was hopeful Dr. Matthews would be employed full-time. Transcript 
volume I p. 159. 
Diane Fish testified she was prepared to look for other work if she had to obtain medical 
insurance. Transcript volume I p. 160. She has a high school degree and technical college training. 
Transcript volume I p. 127. Diane Fish did not testify to any health concerns preventing her from 
full-time work. 
The trial court has a statutory duty to consider the ability of the receiving spouse to produce 
sufficient income for herself. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) provides: 
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(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the 
marriage. 
Numerous Utah cases also hold, in determining alimony, the Court must make adequate 
findings and conclusions, demonstrating it has considered three (3) factors: (1) the financial condition 
and needs of the party seeking alimony; (2) that party's ability to produce a sufficient income; and (3) 
the ability of the other party to provide support. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988); 
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App.1992); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 
(Utah 1985). 
The trial court abused its discretion in not imputing Diane Fish's income at $2,600 per month 
gross wage, $2,080 per month net pay, based upon full-time employment at her present salary. In 
Thronson v. Thronson the trial court imputed full-time wages to Ms. Thronson, assuming she was 
employed on a full-time basis. Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App.1991) 
In Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 554 (Utah App.1993), the trial court imputed income to 
Mrs. Willey based upon a projection of full-time work at her present salary. The Utah Court of 
- 2 1 -
Appeals held, "we do not question the trial court's authority to impute income to Mrs. Willey. 
Imputing income to an unemployed or underemployed spouse when getting an alimony award is 
conceptually appropriate as part of that spouse's ability to produce a sufficient income." 
In this case, even though Diane Fish admitted it was not unreasonable to impute 40 hours per 
week employment to her and that she was looking for a 40-hour per week job, the trial court did not 
impute full-time wages to her. The trial court made no findings of fact why it is inappropriate to 
impute full-time employment to her. Failure to consider the factors enumerated in Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a), constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Accordingly, the trial court must make 
sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial 
court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon these factors. The trial court failed to 
make any findings of fact why Diane Fish should not have full-time employment at $15 per hour 
imputed to her. Considering the facts of this case, Diane Fish should have full-time wages imputed to 
her and it was error not to do so. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING FULL-TIME 
INCOME TO JEFFERY FISH, CONSIDERING HE WAS ENGAGED 
IN CAREER OR OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING AND FAILED 
TO SUPPORT IT WITH SPECIFIC, DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT 
The trial court found Jeffery Fish was capable of working full-time and imputed an income in 
a sum of between $30,000 to $40,000 annually to him. Findings of Fact 26. The trial court found 
Jeffery Fish to be underemployed at the time of trial. Findings of Fact 27. 
Jeffery Fish did not stipulate that income may be imputed to him. Jeffery presented evidence 
to the Court of his historical earnings since his retirement from the military in 2000 and that he was 
engaged in vocational rehabilitation through the Department of Veteran Affairs. Jeffery Fish testified 
he felt he could not be an aircraft mechanic anymore and, after testing, the Department of Veteran 
Affairs accepted him for the vocational rehabilitation. Transcript volume I p. 197 
Jeffery was attending the Ogden- Weber Applied Technology Center at the time of trial. 
Transcript volume I p. 198. He started attending Ogden-Weber ATC full-time in September, 2008 
and was on track to graduate in January, 2010. Transcript volume I p. 198. Jeffery was being trained 
to be a computer technician, to install software and hardware devices. Transcript volume I p. 199. 
He was going to school full-time. Transcript volume I p. 199. Jeffery received the sum of $671.13 
per month to attend Ogden-Weber ATC for vocational rehabilitation. Transcript volume I p. 215 
Jeffery has a history of back pain. Respondent's Exhibit 5. He takes Flexeril for back pain. 
Transcript volume I p. 204-205. Before Jeffery could qualify for vocational rehabilitation, he was 
required to obtain a functional evaluation of his back. Transcript volume I p. 206. Dr. Troy 
Schwartz, medical doctor at Hill AFB, Utah, requested he obtain a functional evaluation of his back 
and feet. Transcript volume I p. 206 
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Jeffery completed a two (2) day Functional Capacity Evaluation on January 8 and 9, 2008 at 
Wasatch Physical Therapy, Inc. Respondent's Exhibit 6. The last page of Respondent ys Exhibit 6 
indicates Jeffery was referred to Wasatch Physical Therapy as he suffered from chronic back and foot 
pain and needed an evaluation regarding his ability to work as an aircraft mechanic. Respondent's 
Exhibit 6. Jeffery's complaint to Wasatch Physical Therapy was that of lower back pain from 
working in awkward positions and repetitive bending, lifting, and twisting as an aircraft mechanic as 
well as chronic foot pain from standing on cement floors for extended periods of time. Respondent's 
Exhibit 6, p. 9. Jeffery was retired from the Air Force with a 10% disability for lumbar sacral strain 
(R at volume Up. 9). 
The results of the Functional Capacity Evaluation revealed the physical requirements of his 
job as an aircraft mechanic did not meet his physical abilities to be an aircraft mechanic. 
Respondent's Exhibit 6, p. 2. Jeffery could not lift and carry heavy equipment weighing over 70 
pounds nor engage in repetitive bending and twisting to work on aircraft, nor stand for eight (8) hour 
shifts. Respondent's Exhibit 6, p. 2 
Ernest Chavez, physical therapist at Wasatch Physical Therapy, testified at the trial. His focus 
in testing the physical capabilities of Jeffery was to test Jeffery to see if he could continue to be an 
aircraft mechanic. Transcript volume lip. 6. In testing Jeffery, Mr. Chavez documented Jeffery 
suffered from a condition known as plantar fasciitis, a tenderness of the plantar fascia on the bottom 
of the foot. TranscriptvolumeIIp.il 
Ernest Chavez testified that Jeffery Fish's physical capabilities did not match the job 
description of an aircraft mechanic. Transcript volume IIp. 15. He recommended job modifications 
or alternative placement. Transcript volume IIp. 15. As for a job modification, he recommended that 
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Jeffery could not lift anything over 70, 80 pounds, not be standing on his feet, and try not to be in 
awkward positions, which can cause more back strain and pain. Transcript volume lip. 16. 
Martin Peterson, an aircraft mechanic and shop foreman at Fair Air Aviation, testified he was 
Jeffery Fish's supervisor when Jeffery Fish worked at Fair Air Aviation. Transcript volume Up. 56-
58. Jeffery was employed there in 2006 to about September, 2007. Transcript volume lip. 58. He 
recalls Jeffery complaining of sore feet, they hurt him badly, and Jeffery had a hard time getting 
through the day. Transcript volume Up. 59. He described aircraft mechanics as being required to 
push and pull aircraft for a distance of 400 feet, lift four (4) 60 pound sand bags to stabilize the tail of 
the aircraft, work underneath the instrument panel, and crawl in the tail section. Transcript volume II 
p. 59-61. He described , at the end of the day, "I'm tired." (R at volume Up. 62) 
After completing the Functional Capacity Evaluation on January 9, 2008, Jeffery applied for 
vocational rehabilitation on March 13, 2008. Transcript volume I p. 207. He was accepted and 
qualified for vocational rehabilitation by the Department of Veteran Affairs. Transcript volume I p. 
197 
If, in this case, Diane Fish was asking the Court to impute income to Jeffery for child support 
and alimony purposes, Diane Fish would have to comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-12-203(7)(d). Diane would have to prove Jeffery was not engaged in career or occupational 
training to establish basic job skills. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(d) states: 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the 
condition is not of a temporary nature: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage; 
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(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic 
job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial 
parent's presence in the home. 
It is not unreasonable to also require, when a party is asking the Court to impute income for 
alimony purposes only, as in this case, that the same requirements be met as when one asks the Court 
to impute income to a spouse for child support and alimony purposes. 
In Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App.1993) the husband challenged the trial court's ruling 
regarding his child support and alimony obligations. He specifically argued, in determining the 
amount of income to be imputed to him, the trial court failed to follow statutory directives in 
assessing his employment potential and probable earnings as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-
203(7)(b). 
In this case, the trial court should not impute income to Jeffery Fish without considering that 
income may not be imputed if one is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job 
skills not of a temporary nature. 
In Mancil v. Smith, 18 P.3d 509, 512 (Utah App.2000) the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
§ 78B-12-203(7)(d)(iii) applies only to short-term job training that is a condition of employment at a 
fairly fundamental level. 
It is not necessary in this case that we definitively state what kind of training 
would qualify: Would a year of vocational school training in welding? An 18-
month course to obtain a paralegal's certificate? A two-year program at a 
community college culminating an associate's degree in bookkeeping? We 
can, however, say that obtaining a bachelor's degree affords employment at a 
level so far beyond "basic" that, as a matter of law, it does not satisfy the 
statute. 
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In this case, Jeffery was attending Ogden-Weber Applied Technology Center from September, 
2008 and was scheduled to graduate in January, 2010, approximately a 17 month course of study. 
The Department of Veteran Affairs was paying Jeffery $671.13 per month to retrain Jeffery in 
computer technology. He was going to school full-time, engaged in vocational rehabilitation. 
The same argument should apply to imputing income to Jeffery Fish for alimony purposes as 
applies to establishing income for child support and alimony purposes. Jeffery's qualifications for 
vocational rehabilitation with the Department of Veteran Affairs is clear evidence that the Functional 
Capacity Evaluation completed by Wasatch Physical Therapy was accepted by the United States 
government and that Jeffery qualified for vocational rehabilitation as he was not suited to be an 
aircraft mechanic. 
It is error for the Court to impute an income to Jeffery at this time. The trial court stated, at 
the conclusion of the case that, "What I am being asked to do is somehow find a way to give Mr. Fish 
more money and I have got to decide that Mr. Fish has got to go to work and pay alimony or I've got 
to decide that he is unable to do that, based on his physical ability and ability to earn income." 
Transcript volume III p. 64. In this case, Jeffery's imputed income should be established after he 
completes his training, consistent with the requirements of § 78B12-203(7)(d)(iii). 
The trial court made no specific findings of fact that Jeffery was not engaged in career or 
occupational training. The trial court received evidence Jeffery was being paid by the Department of 
Veteran Affairs to attend a 17 month course at the Ogden-Weber ATC. The trial court does not reveal 
its analysis of Jeffery's attendance at school on his ability to pay alimony or have income imputed to 
him at the time of trial. 
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Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ESTABLISHING 
ALIMONY BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PARTIES' 
HISTORICAL INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING 
The trial court erred in awarding alimony of $800 per month to Diane Fish, considering the 
parties' standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. The trial court's award of alimony creates a 
serious inequity manifesting a clear abuse of discretion. 
In assessing alimony, trial courts have appropriately relied on historical income rather than 
income at the time of the divorce where a party has experienced a temporary decrease in income. 
Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985); Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah App.1994); 
and Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Utah 1977). Trial courts have also relied on 
historical income where a spouse experiences unusual prosperity during one (1) year. English v. 
English 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977). 
In this case, the parties have maintained a very modest standard of living with modest 
incomes. In 2003, Jeffery earned $18,889 as a logistics specialist in addition to his military 
retirement. Petitioner's Exhibit 17, W-2. Diane earned $ 19,160 that year. Petitioner's Exhibit 17, 
W-2. The total family monthly net pay would be approximately $1,214 for Diane and $1,200 net pay 
for Jeffery, plus approximately $1,477 per month military pay for a total monthly net pay of $3,891. 
This figure is well below the monthly living expenses the trial court detennined for the parties at trial 
of $5,374 ($3,000 plus $2,374). 
In 2004, Jeffery had no income as he worked as a salesman selling parts on E-bay. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 18 and Respondent's Exhibit 3. Jeffery's only source of income was his military 
retirement of approximately $1,477 per month net pay. Diane earned $25,582 in 2004 with 
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approximately $ 1,620 net pay per month. The parties had a monthly net combined pay of $3,097. 
In 2005, Jeffery had no monthly income except his military retirement as he worked as a 
salesman selling parts on E-bay in 2005. Petitioner's Exhibit 19. Diane earned $27,060 in 2005 and 
would have earned approximately $1,714 per month net pay. The parties would have a combined 
monthly net pay of $3,191 in 2005. 
In 2006, Jeffery earned $20,545 at Fair Air Aviation as an aircraft mechanic plus his military 
retired pay. Petitioner 's Exhibit 20 and Respondent 's Exhibit 3. Diane earned $26,186 in 2006. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 20. Their combined monthly net pay would have been approximately $4,436. 
In 2007, Jeffery earned $25,710 as a mechanic at Fair Air Aviation plus his military 
retirement. Petitioner's Exhibit 32. Diane earned $24,582 in 2007. Petitioner's Exhibit 32. Their 
combined monthly net pay would be approximately $4,663. 
In 2008, Jeffery earned $671 per month vocational rehabilitation pay plus his military 
retirement pay. Petitioner fs Exhibit 30. Diane earned $25,862 in 2008. Petitioner's Exhibit 30. 
Their combined monthly net pay in 2008 would have been approximately $3,786. 
In 2009, Jeffery was earning $671 per month vocational rehabilitation pay plus his military 
retirement. Respondent's Exhibit 1. Diane was earning $2,027 per month gross wage and monthly 
net pay of $ 1,545. Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Their combined monthly net pay in 2009 would have been 
$3,693. 
The parties' historical income and standard of living does not support a monthly alimony 
award of $800. Diane would actually have greater income than Jeffery if she is credited with her 
woodward share of the military retirement pay in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009. In 2003 and 
2007, Jeffery's income was slightly higher that of Diane's. The parties' historical income and 
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standard of living during the marriage is very modest and does not justify an award of $800 per month 
alimony. The parties' standard of living should be approximately $2,000 to $2,300 per month to each 
party based upon their past standard of living during the marriage. Their historical standard of living 
does not support the findings of the trial court that Jeffery's monthly needs should be $2,374 per 
month and Diane's monthly needs be $3,000 per month. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards so long as they consider at least 
the following factors, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) (Supp.2009): 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the 
marriage. 
In addition, trial courts must be mindful of the primary purposes of alimony: "(1) to get the 
parties as close as possible to the same standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to 
equalize the standards of living of each party; and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a 
public charge." Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008); Jensen v. Jensen, 197 
P.3d 117,120 (Utah App.2008). 
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Also, trial courts must consider Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) (Supp.2009) in determining 
the standard of living of the parties: 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at 
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection 
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable 
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living at 
the time of trial. 
It is necessary for the trial court to analyze the parties' standard of living that existed during 
the marriage. The bench trial in this case occurred on April 27, 28, and 30, 2009. The parties 
separated on or about October 15, 2007 and Diane Fish filed for divorce in this case on October 30, 
2007. At trial, Diane Fish did not submit her monthly living expenses incurred at the time of 
separation in October, 2007. Diane only submitted her monthly living expenses at the time of trial in 
April, 2009. Petitioner's Exhibit 6. The parties' historical income and standard of living during the 
marriage do not support the standard of living determined by the trial court of $2,374 per month to 
Jeffery and $3,000 per month to Diane, and support an award of $800 per month alimony. It was 
error for the trial court to award $800 per month alimony. 
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IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING $30,000 TO $40,000 
ANNUAL INCOME TO JEFFERY FISH AND FAILED TO 
SUPPORT IT WITH SPECIFIC, DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT 
The trial court found Jeffery Fish was capable of working full-time and imputed an income to 
him in a sum between $30,000 and $40,000 annually. Findings of Fact 33. However, the trial court 
does not indicate what job Jeffery could have that pays him $30,000 to $40,000 per year. 
Jeffery was an aircraft mechanic while he was enlisted in the United States Air Force. 
Transcript volume I p. 109. He retired after 20 years of military service in 2000. Transcript volume I 
p. 96. His taxable income in 1999, the last full year he served in the military, was $29,383. 
Respondent's Exhibit 3. After retiring from the military, Jeffery was employed as an aircraft 
mechanic by Great Western Aviation. Transcript volume I p. 101. In 2001, he earned $31,930 as an 
aircraft mechanic at Great Western. Respondent's Exhibit 3. He worked for Great Western for a little 
over a year. (R at volume I, p. 101). In 2002, Jeffery worked the entire year at Karta Technologies 
and earned $45,085 as a logistics specialist. Petitioner's Exhibit 16. Jeffery was terminated in May, 
2003 because of unacceptable performance. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 4-5. Jeffery was employed at 
Karta as a logistics specialist. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 4-5. He typed documentation related to 
aircraft maintenance testing procedures into technical order format. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 4-5. 
After being terminated by Karta in May, 2003, Jeffery sold auto parts on E-bay during 2004 
and 2005, operating as Fish Enterprises. Petitioner's Exhibits 18 and 19. Jeffery reported no income 
in 2004 and 2005, incurring business losses on his tax return for those years. Petitioner's Exhibits 18 
and 19 
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In 2006, Jeffery earned $20,545 as an aircraft mechanic for Fair Air Aviation. Respondent's 
Exhibit 3. In 2007, Jeffery earned $25,710 as an aircraft mechanic for Fair Air. Respondent's 
Exhibit 3. In 2008, Jeffery was approved for vocational rehabilitation and started attending Ogden-
Weber Applied Technology Center for computer training. He was paid $671 per month by the 
Department of Veteran Affairs while attending school. Jeffery was still attending school at the time 
of trial in April, 2009. Jeffery had not earned more than $25,000 per annum since 2002, a period of 
seven (7) years before the trial. 
Jeffery's occupation in the military, at Great Western Aviation, and at Fair Air Aviation was 
an aircraft mechanic. Jeffery testified he felt he could no longer be an aircraft mechanic. (R at 
volume I p. 197). Jeffery was referred to Wasatch Physical Therapy for a Functional Capacity 
Evaluation to determine if he could physically perform as an aircraft mechanic. (R at volume 1, p. 
206). Jeffery's goal was to regain employment in something that would not increase his pain. 
Respondent's Exhibit 6, p. 9 
The Functional Capacity Evaluation revealed Jeffery's physical abilities were not a job match 
for an aircraft mechanic. Jeffery could not work for eight (8) hours a day, five (5) days a week, lift 
and carry heavy equipment often weighing over 70 pounds, perform repetitive bending and twisting to 
work on aircraft and stand for eight (8) hour shifts. Respondent's Exhibit 6, p. 3 
Ernest Chavez, therapist for Wasatch Physical Therapy, also documented Jeffery experienced 
pain in his feet from a condition known as plantar fasciitis. (R at volume lip. 11). Plantar fasciitis is 
a tenderness of the plantar fascia on the bottom of the foot. (R at volume lip. 11) 
Ernest Chavez's recommendation was that Jeffery could work, but not as an aircraft mechanic. 
(R at volume Up. 13). Jeffery could lift 70 pounds to 80 pounds up to three (3) times a day, but not 
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more often during a work day. (R at volume Up. 14). Jeffery could not also perform repetitive 
bending and twisting. (R at volume lip. 15). He also could not stand on cement floors for eight (8) 
hours a day and increase pressure on his feet by carrying heavy objects. (R at volume Up. 15) 
Kristy Farnsworth, vocational rehabilitation specialist, testified for Diane Fish that, based 
upon Jeffery Fish's work experience, he would most likely be able to obtain employment as an 
aircraft mechanic at a starting salary in the range of $43,070 up to $55,720. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 
19. Her report states it appears that the abilities Mr. Fish demonstrated during the Functional 
Capacity Evaluation are compatible with the physical demands of an aircraft mechanic. Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1, p. 4. Her report indicated an aircraft mechanic is required to lift a maximum of 50 pounds, 
citing the Department of Labor, and only occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 3. She interpreted the designation "M" for strength on being 50 pounds. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 1 Section 1. Kristy Farnsworth offered no independent medical evidence of 
Jeffery's physical capabilities other than that presented by Wasatch Physical Therapy. 
Kristy Farnsworth's report is contrary to the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational 
Handbook, 2008-09. Respondent's Exhibit 8, 9, and 10. The Department of Labor Handbook for 
Aircraft Mechanics actually states, "Mechanics usually work in hangars or in other outdoor areas. 
Frequently mechanics must lift or pull objects weighing more than 70 pounds. They often stand, lie, 
or kneel in awkward positions, and occasionally must work in precarious positions such as on 
scaffolds or ladders...agility is important for the reaching and climbing necessary to do the job." 
Respondent's Exhibit 8, p. 2 
Kristy Farnsworth's analysis of the Functional Capacity Evaluation is incorrect. The 
Functional Capacity Evaluation indicates Jeffery's physical abilities are not a match for an aircraft 
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mechanic. Her conclusion that Jeffery is most likely to obtain employment as an aircraft mechanic is 
not credible and it appears she has simply ignored the findings of the Functional Capacity Evaluation. 
The trial court made no specific findings of whether Jeffery could be employed as an aircraft 
mechanic. 
Kristy Farnsworth reports that Jeffery may obtain full-time employment as a sales 
representative with a beginning salary of $28,330. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p.2. However, the current 
advertised job openings with the Utah Department of Workforce Services listed the pay for sales 
representatives was $10 to $11 per hour. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 11-16. Considering today's 
economy and high unemployment rate, it is questionable that a good paying sales representative job is 
available. Jeffery has no work experience as a sales representative. Kristy Farnsworth's report is 
speculative as to Jeffery's ability to be successfully employed as a salesman. 
Kristy Farnsworth also reported Jeffery's vocational option could also be full-time 
employment with the Federal government as a logistics specialist. However, Jeffery was terminated 
as a logistics specialist with Karta Technologies because of unacceptable performance. Jeffery has 
not demonstrated a historical ability to be a logistics specialist. A logistics specialist is actually a 
technical writer, which requires a bachelor's degree. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Section 2, p. 3. 
In Findings of Fact 26, the trial court found Jeffery capable of working full-time and imputed 
a wage of between $30,000 and $40,000 per year. The Court does not make a specific finding that 
Jeffery is employable as an aircraft mechanic, as a sales representative, or as a logistics specialist. 
Based upon the lack of specific findings, it is unknown what type of employment the trial court 
actually found Jeffery could obtain. It was error for the trial court to impute $30,000 to $40,000 per 
annum income to Jeffery without specific, detailed findings of fact to support the trial court's 
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determination. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Diane Fish is underemployed and full-time wages should be imputed to her. Jeffery Fish was 
engaged in career or occupational training and full-time employment should not be imputed to him 
until he completes his training. The trial court failed to consider the parties' standard of living that 
existed during the marriage and, instead, adopted an inflated standard of living. The trial court's 
award of $800 per month alimony created a serious inequity, resulting in an abuse of discretion. The 
trial court erroneously imputed $30,000 to $40,000 per annum income to Jeffery Fish. Jeffery Fish 
lacks the physical capabilities to continue to be employed as an aircraft mechanic, he has never been 
employed as a sales representative, and was terminated for unacceptable performance as a logistics 
specialist, all of which refute the trial court's imputation of income to him. The trial court made no 
specific, detailed findings of fact supportive of its imputation of income to Jeffery Fish and 
designating what employment it found Jeffery Fish to be suited. The trial court's award of $800 per 
month should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this j day of April 2010. 
NEELEY & NEELEY 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
- 3 7 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
In accordance with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 26(b), I hereby certify that on the 
]</- day of April, 2010 two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of the Appellant 
were served by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to Timothy W. Blackburn, attorney for Petitioner 
/Appellee, at the following address: 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Attorneys at Law 
372 24th Street, Suite 400 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
SECRETARY W 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OBEJOR&K) 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMfijdS^^ 
DIANA FISH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JEFFERY FISH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 074901990 
Ernie W. Jones JUK - e » 
District Judge 
This matter came on for trial on April 27, 2009, April 28, 2009, and April 30, 2009, 
before the Honorable Ernie Jones. The Petitioner was present and represented by Attorney 
Timothy Blackburn. The Respondent was present and represented by Attorney Robert Neeley. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, and having reviewed the exhibits 
introduced at trial rules as follows: 
1. The parties were married on September 5, 1980. 
2. The divorce petition was filed on October 30, 2007. 
3. The parties reside in Weber County, State of Utah, and have done so for at least 3 
months prior to filing for divorce. 
4. Three children were bom as issue of the marriage. None are minors at this time. 
5. There are irreconcilable differences between the parties. The Court will grant the 
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divorce to both parties. 
Alimony: 
6. The purpose of alimony is to enable Petitioner to maintain, as nearly as possible, the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the other party from becoming a 
public charge. 
7. Alimony is not automatically awarded whenever there is a disparity between the 
parties' income. See Burt v. Burt 779 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1990). 
8. Consideration must be made of the needs and abilities of both parties before an award 
of alimony is made. 
9. Alimony findings should consider several factors: 
a) the financial condition and need of the party seeking alimony; 
b) the seeking party's ability to produce a sufficient income for herself; and 
c) the ability of the other party to provide support. 
10. The parties were married on September 5, 1980 (length of marriage almost twenty-
eight years). 
11. Respondent is 47 years old. 
12. Petitioner is over 40 years old. 
Respondent's Income and Expenses: 
13. Respondent receives $1,703.00 each month for military retirement. Of that military 
retirement income, $421.00 is for disability which is exempt from alimony calculation. 
14. Respondent agreed to provide $633.00 per month to Petitioner because she is entitled 
to a portion of Respondent's retirement income. 
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15. Respondent receives $649.00 each month plus $421.00 for disability. 
16. Respondent also receives $671.00 from vocational rehab for schooling. Those checks 
expire, however, in January, 2010. 
17. Respondent was in the Air Force from 1980-2000, and retired after twenty years of 
service as an aircraft mechanic. His annual income was about $38,000 when he retired. (See 
P25). 
18. Respondent worked at Great Western Aviation from September 2000 to October 
2001, earning approximately $27,000 per year. 
19. Respondent was employed at Karta Tech from October 2001 to May 2003, earning 
$3,333.00 to $3,800.00 per month. (See P25 and P26). Respondent's annual income was about 
$27,000 to $46,000. (See P25, P26, and PI, page 5). 
20. Respondent was self-employed from 2003 to 2006 and earned no income. 
21. Respondent worked at Fair Air, L.L.C. from April 2006 to September 2007 with an 
annual salary of $25,382.00. (SeeP13). 
22. Respondent is not employed currently in 2009. 
23. Respondent claims he is unable to work in his former job as an aircraft mechanic 
because of lower back pain and disability. Respondent relies on the fact that he receives military 
disability pay to prove his claim. 
24. Respondent also relies on the testimony of Ernie Chavez, a physical therapist at 
Wasatch Therapy who conducted an evaluation of Respondent on January 8, 2009, and January 
9, 2009. 
25. Mr. Chavez testified the Respondent had a 10% disability. Mr. Chavez said the 
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Respondent could work, but not as an aircraft mechanic. (See Exhibit R6). 
26. The testimony of Mr. Chavez, however, was suspect because he was a close friend of 
the Respondent for many years. 
27. Mr. Chavez admitted on cross-examination that he should have had someone else do 
the evaluation of the Respondent because of the friendship. 
28. Petitioner claims the Respondent is under-employed and capable of working. 
29. Jim and Mary Templeton testified that the Respondent went boating, jet skiing, 
tubing, and perfomied such tasks as laying sod, installing a fence, lifting hay bales, and replacing 
a roof during 2004-2006. 
30. Jim and Mary Templeton said that the Respondent never complained about back pain 
during any of those events. 
31. Kristy Farnsworth, a vocational specialist, conducted an employability evaluation on 
the Respondent in August 2008. (See Exhibit PI). 
32. Ms. Farnsworth concluded that the Respondent could earn between $24,000 and 
$57,000 each year, based on her evaluation. 
33. The Court finds the Respondent is capable of working full-time and will impute 
income in a sum between $30,000 and $40,000 annually to the Respondent. 
34. The Court finds the Respondent is underemployed at this time. 
35. The Respondent's expenses are listed at $2,374.00 each month. (See Rl). 
36. The Court finds the expenses are reasonable. 
Petitioner's Income and Expenses: 
37. The Petitioner earned about $25,000 in 2008 as gross income. (See P2 and P3). 
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38. Petitioner's net monthly income for 2008 is $1,628.00. 
39. Petitioner's average gross monthly income for January-April 2009 is about $2,000.00 
per month. (See Exhibit P4). 
40. Petitioner lists her monthly expenses at $3,500.00 - $3,600.00. (See Exhibit P4). 
41. The Court finds Petitioner's expenses are generally reasonable and necessary, but may 
be a little high. The Court believes Petitioner's expenses should be about $3,000.00 per month. 
Tax Returns: 
42. The joint returns show the following income for the parties: 
Year: Gross Income: Exhibit: 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
$73,238.00 
$64,000.00 
$27,191.00 
$34,600.00 
$45,700.00 
$54,774.00 
(P16) 
(P17) 
(P18) 
(P19) 
(P20) 
(P37) 
2008 $25,816.00 (P30) 
43. The tax returns for 2002 - 2008 show the parties are capable of earning a reasonable 
income. 
44. The tax returns also show that Respondent was either not working or quit working 
during 2004, 2005, and 2008. 
45. The Court finds the tax returns are relevant to establish income potential for both 
parties. 
Page -5-
46. The Court finds the Respondent has the ability to work and earn between $30,000 and 
$40,000 each year. 
47. The Court finds the Petitioner has the need for alimony based on her income and 
expenses. 
48. The Court also finds the Petitioner has the ability to work and earn income. 
49. The Court finds this was a lengthy marriage (27-28 years) and that alimony is 
appropriate. 
50. The Court finds both parties are at fault for the divorce. 
51. The Court awards Petitioner alimony of $800.00 per month for a period of 27 years. 
52. However, alimony shall terminate if Petitioner remarries, cohabitates, or dies. 
401k & Retirement: 
53. Both parties have a 401k retirement plan. 
54. Petitioner's 401k currently has a vested balance of $14,537.84. (See Exhibit P24). 
55. Respondent's 401k vested balance is currently $3,664.20. (See Exhibits P27 & Rl 1). 
56. The parties agree that each is entitled to Vi of the 401k plans, or $9,101.00. 
57. Respondent will keep his 401k ($3,664.00) and receive $5,437 from the Petitioner's 
401k. 
58. Petitioner will retain $9,101.00 from her 401k. 
59. Only one QDRO will be required to equalize the 401k plans. 
60. Respondent also agrees to pay the Petitioner $633.00 per month from his military 
retirement. 
Miscellaneous: 
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61. The parties have settled the issues involving the Vacation Club and one of the 
parties' debts. 
62. The issue of the massage table is moot, as it was sold. 
Life Insurance: 
63. The Respondent has life insurance and has listed the tliree children as beneficiaries 
of the policy. 
64. The Petitioner is not listed as a beneficiary but is asking the Court to do so. 
65. The Court will not order the Respondent to list Petitioner as a beneficiary on the 
policy. 
Medical Insurance: 
66. Each party is responsible for their own medical, health, and dental insurance. 
Survivor Benefits Plan (SBP): 
67. The Respondent had the option to obtain a survivor benefits plan when he retired 
from the Air Force. 
68. The parties apparently elected not to obtain the benefits at the time of retirement. 
69. The Court finds the Petitioner may obtain those benefits if the Air Force is willing to 
offer the benefits to her at this time, and if the Petitioner pays the costs of obtaining such 
benefits. 
70. The Respondent is not responsible for such benefits. 
Attorney Fees and Witness Fees: 
71. Both parties have incurred attorney fees. 
72. Petitioner is seeking to have Respondent pay a portion of his attorney fees. 
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73. The Court finds that both parties were at fault for the divorce. 
74. Each party has the ability to pay their attorney fees. 
75. The Court orders each party to pay their own attorney fees. 
76. The Court finds there is no bad faith by either party in this divorce action. 
77. However, the Court will order each party to pay Vi the fees and costs incurred 
for Kristy Farnsworth's testimony and report as an expert witness. 
78. The Court will request Petitioner's attorney prepare the findings and decree 
of divorce, and submit for signature and entry. 
?2009. 
SKNIE JONES 
DISTRICT COURT JUDtjE 
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Fish vs. Fish, 
Case Number: 074901990 
Certificate of Mailing: 
I hereby certify that on the j Q of June 2009, I mailed a copy of the foregoing order to 
counsel, as follows: 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Attorney for Petitioner 
372 24th Street, Ste 400 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Robert L. Neeley 
Attorney for Respondent 
2845 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84401 
jiM OJ&H 
nna Woodring 
fead Deputy Court' Clerk 
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DISTRICT COURT 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Timothy W. Blackburn (0355) 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
2404 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
Facsimile: (801)627-2522 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE FISH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JEFFERY J. FISH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
SEP 2 S 2003 
Case No. 074901990 
Honorable Ernie W. Jones 
Commissioner Catherine Conklin 
The above matter came regularly for trial before the Honorable Ernie W. Jones on 
April 27, 28 and 30, 2009. The Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, 
Timothy W. Blackburn, and the Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, 
Robert L. Neeley, and the court having taken the matter under advisement and having entered 
its Memorandum Decision on June 15, 2009, enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married on September 5, 1980. 
2. The divorce petition was filed on October 30, 2007. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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3. The parties reside in Weber County, State of Utah, and have done so for at 
least three months prior to filing for the divorce. 
4. There were three children born as issue or the marriage; all are adults. 
5. There are irreconcilable differences between the parties and the court will grant 
a divorce to both parties 
6. The purpose of alimony is to enable Petitioner to maintain, as nearly as 
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the other party 
from becoming a public charge. Alimony is not automatically awarded whenever there is a 
disparity between the parties' income. Consideration must be made of the needs and abilities 
of both parties before an award of alimony is made. 
7. The court considered several factors in determining alimony: 
A. The financial condition and need of the Petitioner; 
B. The Petitioner's ability to produce a sufficient income for herself; and 
C. The ability of the other party to provide support; and 
D. The needs of the Respondent. 
8. The parties were married almost twenty-eight (28) years. The Respondent is 
47 years old and the Petitioner is 48 years old. 
9. Respondent receives $1,703 each month from military retirement. Of that 
retirement income, $421 is for disability which is exempt from alimony calculation. 
10. Respondent agreed to provide $633 per month to Petitioner because she is 
entitled to an equal portion of Respondent's retirement. 
-2-
11. Respondent receives $649 each month from his retirement, plus $421 for 
disability. 
12. Respondent also receives $671 from vocational rehab for schooling. These 
checks, however, expire in January 2010. 
13. Respondent was in the air Force from 1980 to 2000 and retired after twenty 
(20) years of service as an aircraft mechanic. His annual income was approximately $38,000 
when he retired (see Petitioner's Exhibit 25). 
14. Respondent worked at Great Western Aviation from September 2000 to 
October 2001, earning approximately $27,000 per year. 
15. Respondent was employed at Karta Technologies from October 2001 to May 
2003, earning $3,333 to $3,800 per month (see Petitioner's Exhibits 25 and 26). 
Respondent's annual income while at Karta was approximately $27,000 to $46,000 (see 
Petitioner's Exhibits 25, 26 and 1, page 5). 
16. Respondent was self employed from 2003 to 2006 and earned no income. 
17. Respondent worked at Fair Air L.L.C. from April 2006 to September 2007 
with an annual salary of $25,382 (see Petitioner's Exhibit 13). 
18. Respondent is not employed currently in 2009. 
19. Respondent claims he is unable to work in his former job as an aircraft 
mechanic because of lower back pain and disability. Respondent relies on the fact that he 
receives military disability pay to prove his claim. 
20. Respondent also relies on the testimony of Ernie Chavez, a physical therapist at 
Wasatch Therapy who conducted an evaluation of Respondent on January 8, 2009 and January 
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9, 2009. Mr. Chavez testified thai the Respondent had a ten percent (10%) disability. Mr. 
Chaves said that the Respondent could work but not as an aircraft mechanic (see 
Respondent's Exhibit 6). 
21. The testimony of Mr. Chavez, however, was suspect because he was a close 
friend of the Respondent for many years. 
22. Mr. Chavez admitted on cross-examination that he should have had someone 
else do the evaluation of the Respondent because of his friendship. 
23. Petitioner claims the Respondent is under-employed and capable of working. 
24. Jim and Mary Templeton testified that the Respondent went boating, jet skiing, 
tubing and performed such tasks as laying sod, installing a fence, lifting hay bales, and 
replacing a roof during 2004-2006. Jim and Mary Templeton said the Respondent never 
complained about back pain during any of these events. 
25. Kristy Farnsworth, a vocational specialist, conducted an employability 
evaluation on the Respondent in August 2008 (see Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Ms. Farnsworth 
concluded the Respondent could earn between $24,000 and $57,000 each year based on her 
evaluation. 
26. The Respondent is capable of working full time and the court will impute an 
income in a sum between $30,000 and $40,000 annually to the Respondent. 
27. The Respondent is underemployed at this time. 
28. The Respondent's expenses are listed at $2,374 each month. The court finds 
the Respondent's expenses are reasonable. 
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29. The Petitioner earned about $25,000 in 2008 as gross income (see Petitioner's 
Exhibits 2 and 3). 
30. The Petitioner's net monthly income for 2008 is $1,628. 
31. Petitioner's average gross monthly income for January through April 2009 is 
about $2,000 per month (see Petitioner's Exhibit 4). 
32. Petitioner lists her monthly expenses at $3,500 to $3,600 (see Petitioner's 
Exhibit 4). The court finds Petitioner's expenses are generally reasonable and necessary, but 
may be a little high. The court finds that petitioner's expenses are $3,000 per month. 
33. The joint tax returns for the parties show the following income for the parties: 
Year 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Gross 
Income 
$73,238 
$64,000 
$27,191 
$34,600 
$45,700 
$54,774 
$25,816 
Exhibi 
t 
P16 
P17 
P18 
P19 
P20 
P37 
P30 
34. The tax returns for 2002 through 2008 show the parties are capable of earning a 
reasonable income. 
35. The tax returns also show that Respondent was either not working or quit 
working during 2004, 2005 and 2008. 
36. The tax returns are relevant to establish income potential for both parties. 
37. The Petitioner has the need for alimony based on her income and expenses. 
38. The Petitioner has the ability to work and earn income. 
39. This was a lengthy marriage (27-28 years) and that alimony is appropriate. 
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40. Both parties are at fault for the divorce. 
41. The court awards Petitioner alimony of $800 per month. Said alimony begins 
June 15, 2009. Alimony shall terminate upon the Petitioner's remarriage, cohabitation, or if 
the respondent dies, or the length of the marriage, whichever occurs first. 
42. Both parties have a 401(k) retirement plan. Petitioner's 401(k) currently has a 
vested balance of $14,537.84 (see Petitioner's Exhibit 24). Respondent's 401(k) vested 
balance is currently $3,664.20. The parties agree that each party is entitled to one half of the 
401(k) or $9,101. The Respondent will keep his 401(k) ($3,664) and receive $5,437 from the 
Petitioner's 401(k). The Petitioner shall retain $9,101 from her 401(k). Only one QDRO will 
be required to equalize the 401(k) plans and the Respondent's attorney shall prepare the 
QDRO. 
43. The parties have settled the issues involving the Vacation Club and debts. 
44. The issue of the massage table is moot as it has been sold. 
45. Respondent has life insurance and listed the three children as beneficiaries on 
the policy. The Petitioner is not listed as a beneficiary but asked the court to do so. The court 
did not find that it is necessary to list the Petitioner as a beneficiary on the Respondent's life 
insurance. 
46. Each party is responsible for their own medical, health and dental insurance 
after the divorce is final. 
47. The parties had the option to obtain a survivor benefits plan when he retired 
from the Air Force. The parties elected not to obtain the benefits at the time of retirement. 
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The court finds the Petitioner may obtain those benefits if the Air Force is willing to offer the 
benefits to her at this time and if Petitioner pays the costs of obtaining such benefits. 
48. Both parties have incurred attorney fees. Petitioner is seeking to have 
Respondent pay a portion of the attorney fees. The court finds that both parties were at fault 
in the divorce. Each party has the ability to pay their own attorney fees. The court finds there 
was no bad faith by either party in this divorce action. However, the court will order each 
party to pay one half the fees and costs incurred for Kristy Farnsworth's testimony and report 
as an expert witness. One half of the fees and costs are $1,248. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters its Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A Decree of Divorce is issued to both parties, the same to become final upon 
entry. 
2. The Respondent shall pay alimony to the Petitioner at $800 per month to begin 
June 15, 2009. The alimony for June is prorated and therefore $400 is due. Each month 
thereafter alimony is due on the 1st of the month and is delinquent on the 5lh of the month. 
Alimony shall terminate upon the Petitioner's remarriage, cohabitation, if Respondent dies or 
the length of the marriage, whichever occurs first. 
3. The Petitioner is awarded $633 plus any costs of living increases from the 
Respondent's military retirement. The cost of living is on a prorated basis with the fraction 
being the numerator of $633 and the denominator being $1,703 times the amount of any cost 
of living increases. The Respondent shall begin paying the Petitioner on June 15, 2009. One 
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half of the $633 shall be due for the month of June and beginning July 1st the total amount is 
due. Said amount is due on the 1st of the month or when Respondent receives his Military 
Retirement, whichever occurs first. Until the Military begins paying the Petitioner directly 
Respondent has the responsibility to pay Petitioner her share of the retirement. 
4. The Petitioner shall file the necessary paperwork with DFAS. DFAS shall pay 
the Petitioner's share directly to her. However, until the time that DFAS starts paying 
Petitioner's share directly to her, Respondent shall pay the Petitioner the $633 per month. 
5. Petitioner is awarded judgment against the Respondent for $1,248 which is one 
half of Kristy Farnsworth's fees and costs. 
6. The Respondent shall receive from Petitioner's 401 (k) $5,437. The 
Respondent's attorney is to prepare the QDRO necessary to transfer said money. Said money 
shall be transferred without any tax consequence to either party. The Petitioner is awarded the 
remainder of her 401(k) or $9,101. The Respondent is awarded his 401(k) of $3,664. The 
401(k)'s are divided equally. 
7. The Respondent may list anyone he desires as a beneficiary on his life 
insurance policy. 
8. Each party is responsible for their own medical, health and dental insurance 
after the date of divorce. 
9. The Petitioner may obtain the survivor annuity benefit from the Air Force if the 
Air Force is willing to offer this benefit to her at this time. Petitioner would be responsible 
for the costs of obtaining such benefits. 
10. The issue of the massage table is moot as it was sold. 
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11. The parties have settled the Vacation Club. 
12. Each party shall pay their own debts they have incurred after October 30, 2007. 
DATED this ^ j&ay of ^ ^ < K ^ ^ ^ ^ , 2009. 
By the Court: /* 
^rnie W. Jones 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned will 
submit the foregoing to the Honorable Ernie W. Jones, District Court Judge, for signature 
upon the expiration of eight (8) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time. 
I hereby certify that on this of September, 2009,1 caused to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to: 
Robert L. Neeley 
Attorney for Respondent 
2485 Grant Avenue Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84401 
/ j f / v W ~ / 'jLhidLYtaA 
-9-
ADDENDUM 
C 
FEB BSB eTS 
J SEP 2 q 2009 I 
S E C O N D ^ 
DISTRICT COURT 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Timothy W. Blackburn (0355) 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
Facsimile: (801)627-2522 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE FISH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JEFFERY J. FISH, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
SEP 2 9 2009 
Case No. 074901990 
Honorable Ernie W. Jones 
Commissioner Catherine Conklin 
The above matter came for trial on April 27, 28, and 30, 2009, before the Honorable 
Ernie W. Jones. The Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Timothy W. 
Blackburn, and the Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, Robert L. 
Neeley, and the court having heard the testimony of the parties and having reviewed the 
Exhibits and entered its Memorandum Decision, and having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, enters its Divorce Decree as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. A Decree of Divorce is issued to both parties, the same to become final upon 
entry. 
2. The Respondent shall pay alimony to the Petitioner at $800 per month to begin 
June 15, 2009. The alimony for June is prorated and therefore $400 is due. Each month 
thereafter alimony is due on the 1st of the month and is delinquent on the 5th of the month. 
Alimony shall terminate upon the Petitioner's remarriage, cohabitation, if Respondent dies or 
the length of the marriage, whichever occurs first. 
3. The Petitioner is awarded $633 plus any costs of living increases from the 
Respondent's military retirement. The cost of living is on a prorated basis with the fraction 
being the numerator of $633 and the denominator being $1,703 times the amount of any cost 
of living increases. The Respondent shall begin paying the Petitioner on June 15, 2009. One 
half of the $633 shall be due for the month of June and beginning July 1st the total amount is 
due. Said amount is due on the 1st of the month or when Respondent receives his Military 
Retirement, whichever occurs first. Until the Military begins paying the Petitioner directly 
Respondent has the responsibility to pay Petitioner her share of the retirement. 
4. The Petitioner shall file the necessary paperwork with DFAS. DFAS shall pay 
the Petitioner's share directly to her. However, until the time that DFAS starts paying 
Petitioner's share directly to her, Respondent shall pay the Petitioner the $633 per month. 
5. Petitioner is awarded judgment against the Respondent for $1,248 which is one 
half of Kristy Farnsworth's fees and costs. 
6. The Respondent shall receive from Petitioner's 401(k) $5,437. The 
Respondent's attorney is to prepare the QDRO necessary to transfer said money. Said money 
shall be transferred without any tax consequence to either party. The Petitioner is awarded 
the remainder of her 401(k) or $9,101. The Respondent is awarded his 401(k) of $3,664. The 
401(k)'s are divided equally. 
7. The Respondent may list anyone he desires as a beneficiary on his life 
insurance policy. 
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8. Each party is responsible for their own medical, health and dental insurance 
after the divorce is final. 
9. The Petitioner may obtain the survivor annuity benefit from the Air Force if 
the air Force is willing to offer this benefit to her at this time. Petitioner would be responsible 
for the costs of obtaining such benefits. 
10. The issue of the massage table is moot as it was sold. 
11. The parties have settled the Vacation Club. 
12. Each party shall pay their own debts they have incurred after October 30, 2007. 
DATED this O j j d a y of ^ ^ ^ X ^ ^ T , 2009. 
By the Court: 
/^firnie W. Jones 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned will 
submit the foregoing to the Honorable Ernie W. Jones, District Court Judge, for signature 
upon the expiration of eight (8) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time. 
I hereby certify that on this of September, 2009,1 caused to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to: 
Robert L. Neeley 
Attorney for Respondent 
2485 Grant Avenue Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84401 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, feTATE OBEnQ^T 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN nff.PAPTTMHMmfiiSLRlCT COURT 
DIANA FISH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JEFFERY FISH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 074901990 
Ernie W.Jones iJUN ] 6 W 
District Judge 
This matter came on for trial on April 27, 2009, April 28, 2009, and April 30, 2009, 
before the Honorable Ernie Jones. The Petitioner was present and represented by Attorney 
Timothy Blackburn. The Respondent was present and represented by Attorney Robert Neeley. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, and having reviewed the exhibits 
introduced at trial, rules as follows: 
1. The parties were married on September 5, 1980. 
2. The divorce petition was filed on October 30,2007. 
3. The parties reside in Weber County, State of Utah, and have done so for at least 3 
months prior to filing for divorce. 
4. Three children were born as issue of the marriage. None are minors at this time. 
5. There are irreconcilable differences between the parties. The Court will grant the 
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divorce to both parties. 
Alimony: 
6. The purpose of alimony is to enable Petitioner to maintain, as nearly as possible, the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the other party from becoming a 
public charge. 
7. Alimony is not automatically awarded whenever there is a disparity between the 
parties' income. See Burt v. Burt 779 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1990). 
8. Consideration must be made of the needs and abilities of both parties before an award 
of alimony is made. 
9. Alimony findings should consider several factors: 
a) the financial condition and need of the party seeking alimony; 
b) the seeking party's ability to produce a sufficient income for herself; and 
c) the ability of the other party to provide support. 
10. The parties were married on September 5, 1980 (length of marriage almost twenty-
eight years). 
11. Respondent is 47 years old. 
12. Petitioner is over 40 years old. 
Respondent's Income and Expenses: 
13. Respondent receives $1,703.00 each month for military retirement. Of that military 
retirement income, $421.00 is for disability which is exempt from alimony calculation. 
14. Respondent agreed to provide $633.00 per month to Petitioner because she is entitled 
to a portion of Respondent's retirement income. 
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15. Respondent receives $649.00 each month plus $421.00 for disability. 
16. Respondent also receives $671.00 from vocational rehab for schooling. Those checks 
expire, however, in January, 2010. 
17. Respondent was in the Air Force from 1980-2000, and retired after twenty years of 
service as an aircraft mechanic. His annual income was about $38,000 when he retired. (See 
P25). 
18. Respondent worked at Great Western Aviation from September 2000 to October 
2001, earning approximately $27,000 per year. 
19. Respondent was employed at Karta Tech from October 2001 to May 2003, earning 
$3,333.00 to $3,800.00 per month. (See P25 and P26). Respondent's annual income was about 
$27,000 to $46,000. (See P25, P26, and PI, page 5). 
20. Respondent was self-employed from 2003 to 2006 and earned no income. 
21. Respondent worked at Fair Air, L.L.C. from April 2006 to September 2007 with an 
annual salary of $25,382.00. (See P13). 
22. Respondent is not employed currently in 2009. 
23. Respondent claims he is unable to work in his former job as an aircraft mechanic 
because of lower back pain and disability. Respondent relies on the fact that he receives military 
disability pay to prove his claim. 
24. Respondent also relies on the testimony of Ernie Chavez, a physical therapist at 
Wasatch Therapy who conducted an evaluation of Respondent on January 8, 2009, and January 
9, 2009. 
25. Mr. Chavez testified the Respondent had a 10% disability. Mr. Chavez said the 
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Respondent could work, but not as an aircraft mechanic. (See Exhibit R6). 
26. The testimony of Mr. Chavez, however, was suspect because he was a close friend of 
the Respondent for many years. 
27. Mr. Chavez admitted on cross-examination that he should have had someone else do 
the evaluation of the Respondent because of the friendship. 
28. Petitioner claims the Respondent is under-employed and capable of working. 
29. Jim and Mary Templeton testified that the Respondent went boating, jet skiing, 
tubing, and perforaied such tasks as laying sod, installing a fence, lifting hay bales, and replacing 
a roof during 2004-2006. 
30. Jim and Mary Templeton said that the Respondent never complained about back pain 
during any of those events. 
31. Kristy Farnsworth, a vocational specialist, conducted an employability evaluation on 
the Respondent in August 2008. (See Exhibit PI). 
32. Ms. Farnsworth concluded that the Respondent could earn between $24,000 and 
$57,000 each year, based on her evaluation. 
33. The Court finds the Respondent is capable of working full-time and will impute 
income in a sum between $30,000 and $40,000 annually to the Respondent. 
34. The Court finds the Respondent is underemployed at this time. 
35. The Respondent's expenses are listed at $2,374.00 each month. (See Rl). 
36. The Court finds the expenses are reasonable. 
Petitioner's Income and Expenses: 
37. The Petitioner earned about $25,000 in 2008 as gross income. (See P2 and P3). 
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38. Petitioner's net monthly income for 2008 is $1,628.00. 
39. Petitioner's average gross monthly income for January-April 2009 is about $2,000.00 
per month. (See Exhibit P4). 
40. Petitioner lists her monthly expenses at $3,500.00 - $3,600.00. (See Exhibit P4). 
41. The Court finds Petitioner's expenses are generally reasonable and necessary, but may 
be a little high. The Court believes Petitioner's expenses should be about $3,000.00 per month. 
Tax Returns: 
42. The joint returns show the following income for the parties: 
Year: Gross Income: Exhibit: 
2002 $73,238.00 (P16) 
2003 $64,000.00 (PI 7) 
2004 $27,191.00 (P18) 
2005 $34,600.00 (P19) 
2006 $45,700.00 (P20) 
2007 $54,774.00 (P37) 
2008 $25,816.00 (P30) 
43. The tax returns for 2002 - 2008 show the parties are capable of earning a reasonable 
income. 
44. The tax returns also show that Respondent was either not working or quit working 
during 2004, 2005, and 2008. 
45. The Court finds the tax returns are relevant to establish income potential for both 
parties. 
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46. The Court finds the Respondent has the ability to work and earn between $30,000 and 
$40,000 each year. 
47. The Court finds the Petitioner has the need for alimony based on her income and 
expenses. 
48. The Court also finds the Petitioner has the ability to work and earn income. 
49. The Court finds this was a lengthy marriage (27-28 years) and that alimony is 
appropriate. 
50. The Court finds both parties are at fault for the divorce. 
51. The Court awards Petitioner alimony of $800.00 per month for a period of 27 years. 
52. However, alimony shall terminate if Petitioner remarries, cohabitates, or dies. 
401k & Retirement: 
53. Both parties have a 401k retirement plan. 
54. Petitioner's 401k currently has a vested balance of $14,537.84. (See Exhibit P24). 
55. Respondent's 401k vested balance is currently $3,664.20. (See Exhibits P27 & Rl 1). 
56. The parties agree that each is entitled to Vi of the 401k plans, or $9,101.00. 
57. Respondent will keep his 401k ($3,664.00) and receive $5,437 from the Petitioner's 
401k. 
58. Petitioner will retain $9,101.00 from her 401k. 
59. Only one QDRO will be required to equalize the 401k plans. 
60. Respondent also agrees to pay the Petitioner $633.00 per month from his military 
retirement. 
Miscellaneous: 
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61. The parties have settled the issues involving the Vacation Club and one of the 
parties' debts. 
62. The issue of the massage table is moot, as it was sold. 
Life Insurance: 
63. The Respondent has life insurance and has listed the three children as beneficiaries 
of the policy. 
64. The Petitioner is not listed as a beneficiary but is asking the Court to do so. 
65. The Court will not order the Respondent to list Petitioner as a beneficiary on the 
policy. 
Medical Insurance: 
66. Each party is responsible for their own medical, health, and dental insurance. 
Survivor Benefits Plan (SBP): 
67. The Respondent had the option to obtain a survivor benefits plan when he retired 
from the Air Force. 
68. The parties apparently elected not to obtain the benefits at the time of retirement. 
69. The Court finds the Petitioner may obtain those benefits if the Air Force is willing to 
offer the benefits to her at this time, and if the Petitioner pays the costs of obtaining such 
benefits. 
70. The Respondent is not responsible for such benefits. 
Attorney Fees and Witness Fees: 
71. Both parties have incurred attorney fees. 
72. Petitioner is seeking to have Respondent pay a portion of his attorney fees. 
Page -7-
73. The Court finds that both parties were at fault for the divorce. 
74. Each party has the ability to pay their attorney fees. 
75. The Court orders each party to pay their own attorney fees. 
76. The Court finds there is no bad faith by either party in this divorce action. 
77. However, the Court will order each party to pay !4 the fees and costs incurred 
for Kristy Farnsworth's testimony and report as an expert witness. 
78. The Court will request Petitioner's attorney prepare the findings and decree 
of divorce, and submit for signature and entry. 
Dated this 
BK&IE JONES 
DISTRICT COURT JUEtaE 
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Fish vs. Fish, 
Case Number: 074901990 
Certificate of Mailing: 
I hereby certify that on the / Q of June 2009, I mailed a copy of the foregoing order to 
counsel, as follows: 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Attorney for Petitioner 
372 24th Street, Ste 400 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Robert L. Neeley 
Attorney for Respondent 
2845 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84401 
?nna Woodring 
1/ead Deputy Court Clerk 
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